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The poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For
him, the law is always taking something away.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The poor need legal counsel, but cannot afford to pay legal fees.
Without counsel, the poor are denied access to our system of justice.
These simple facts concern many who believe that the widespread sus-
picion that law fails to secure justice will "[poison] the faith of the
people in their own government and in law itself."'2 This article does
not attempt an abstract or comprehensive discussion of the parame-
ters of the lawyer's duty to solve this problem; that has been the sub-
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Clinical Program, University of Miami
School of Law; B.A., 1971, Washington Square College, New York University; J.D., 1975,
University of Miami School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professors Robert Rosen and
Jennifer Jaff for their comments and suggestions, and The Florida Bar and The Florida Justice
Institute, Inc., for making source material available.
1. Address by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Law Day at University of Chicago
Law School (May 1, 1964), quoted in P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAW AND POVERTY 6 n.13 (1965).
2. R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR at xi-xii (1919).
There is no more serious menace than the discontent which is fostered by a belief
that one cannot enforce his legal rights because of poverty.
C.E. Hughes, Legal Aid Societies, Their Function and Necessity, in 45 REPORTS OF AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION 227, 235 (C. Morrison official reporter 1920) (report of the 43d annual
meeting of the A.B.A.).
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ject of other articles.' This article will instead focus on the role that
the Supreme Court of Florida has assumed in promoting the full
availability of legal services and will explore reasonable expectations
for future action given that role.
The Florida experience is noteworthy because the issue of the
responsibility to make legal services available, especially to the poor,
has surfaced in a variety of recent judicial proceedings. Much has
been said, but little has yet been done to make legal services more
available to the poor. Despite the historical record, there is reason to
believe that Florida will lead the way in developing new and innova-
tive methods for delivering legal services to the poor. First, the
Supreme Court of Florida seems to be aware of the need for action,
and has recognized that it has the duty to promote the full availability
of legal services.4 The court has made a commitment to use its super-
visory power to assure that the necessary steps are taken to address
this problem.5 Second, the court's pioneering role in the creation of
the Interest on Trust Accounts (IOTA) Program6 demonstrates that
it is able to develop unique and innovative methods for delivering
legal services to the poor.
As this article will demonstrate, the court has, in the past, asked
others to study the problem, but has not followed the advice that
3. See, e.g., Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REV. 438 (1965); Christensen, A Lawyer's Pro
Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.; Ehrlich, Charles H. Miller
Lecture-Lawyer's and Their Public Service Responsibilities, 46 TENN. L. REV. 713 (1979);
Ehrlich, Rationing Justice, 34 REC. 729 (1979); Marks, A Lawyer's Duty to Take All Comers
and Many Who Do Not Come, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 915 (1976); Petrey, The Public Service
Responsibility of the Bar, 54 FLA. B.J. 612 (1980); Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical
and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981); Shapiro, The Enigma of the
Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980); Smurl, In the Public Interest: The
Precedents and Standards of a Lawyer's Public Responsibility, 11 IND. L. REV. 797 (1978);
Spencer, Mandatory Public Service for Attorneys: A Proposalfor the Future, 12 Sw. U.L. REV.
493 (1981); Sundberg, Professional Duty and Pro Bono, 55 FLA. B.J. 502 (1981).
4. See text accompanying notes 10-13 & 26.
5. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1979).
6. Matter of Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1979); In re Interest on
Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1978); see also The Florida Bar Foundation Charter,
reprinted in FLORIDA RULES OF COURT 717-20 (West 1987); Bylaws of The Florida Bar
Foundation, reprinted in FLORIDA RULES OF COURT 721-26 (West 1987). IOTA programs
operate on the premise that client trust funds constitute an unused economic
resource which may be mobilized to generate income to improve the delivery of
legal services to the poor. [IOTA] programs authorize attorneys to pool nominal
or short term client trust funds, which before [IOTA] were deposited in interest-
free checking accounts, and deposit them in NOW or Super NOW checking
accounts. The interest generated from these accounts is then used to support
legal services to the poor and to fund other law-related public purposes.
Siegel, Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account Programs: Do They "Take" "Property" of the Cli-
ent?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 674, 674-75 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
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others have given. The most frequently made recommendation has
been that the court adopt a mandatory public service requirement as a
condition of licensure or as part of the profession's ethical rules. This
proposal, which has come to be known as mandatory pro bono, has
been rejected by both the Bar and the court. This suggestion may
seem extreme to those unfamiliar with the poor's unmet need for legal
services. It has, however, been made again and again by lawyers who
have studied the problem and concluded that something must be
done, and that other proposals would provide little relief.7 It is time
for the court to act. The court should convene proceedings under its
supervisory power to study the problem and implement solutions.
II. THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE
The development of legal aid to the poor in Florida paralleled
developments in several other states.' A 1972 study, sponsored by
The Florida Bar and the University of Florida, disclosed "[a] vast
unmet need for legal services."9 The study proposed forty recommen-
7. For discussion of mandatory pro bono recommendations in Florida, see CENTER FOR
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, HOLLAND LAW CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND UNDERREPRESENTED CITIZENS OF FLORIDA: AN
OVERVIEW (J. Mills ed. 1980) [hereinafter FURMAN STUDY]; SPECIAL COMMISSION ON
ACCESS TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM, RECOMMENDATIONS (May 16, 1985) [hereinafter SPECIAL
COMMISSION]; The Florida Bar, Special Committee on Pro Bono Service to the Board of
Governors, The Pro Bono Committee Report (n.d.) [hereinafter Fla. Pro Bono Report]. These
studies represent the major bar responses to the access problem in Florida. The
recommendations, however, were not implemented. The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York had a similar experience. A committee studied the problem and proposed a
mandatory 30-50 hour yearly pro bono requirement which could not be satisfied by cash
payments. THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATION, TOWARD A MANDATORY
CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER 5 (1979) [hereinafter
N.Y. PRO BONO REPORT]. The Bar's Executive Committee refused to support this proposal.
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 737 n.8.
8. See Fried & Siegel, The Unmet Need: Providing Legal Services to the Poor, 55 FLA.
B.J. 313 (1981). Although legal aid in various voluntary and associational forms dates back to
the late 19th century, and gained momentum in the early part of this century,
organized and stable efforts to provide legal services for those persons who
needed aid but were unable to pay for it did not reach meaningful levels until
1965. Before the creation of the Legal Services Program under the auspices of
the Office of Economic Opportunity, the history of legal aid was largely a story of
volunteerism or elective benevolence, ad libitim, and depended on the irregular
stirring of altruistic motivations.
Smurl, supra note 3, at 799. For a history of the legal aid movement, see E. BROWNELL,
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); R. SMITH, supra note 2. For a history of private
bar involvement, see Smith, Private Bar Involvement in Legal Services to the Poor Florida, FLA.
B.J., Dec. 1985, at 12.
9. Levinson & Strong, Highlights of Report on Methods of Increasing the Supply of
Legal Services to the Indigent in Florida (Feb. 7, 1972) (summarizing report for the Board of
Governors of The Florida Bar) (available through The Florida Bar).
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dations to increase the supply of legal services to Florida indigents,10
and noted:
[P]ro bono services will continue to be needed as an essential sup-
plement to whatever institutional programs exist now or in the
future, since it is highly unlikely that institutional programs will
ever have sufficient resources to provide all legal services needed by
the indigent."
The extent to which individual lawyers are or should be obligated to
make legal services available to indigents without fee has since been
an issue in Florida.
A. Furman I
The question of what role the Supreme Court of Florida should
play in promoting the full availability of legal services to the poor first
arose in Florida Bar v. Furman (Furman I).2 In Furman I, the court
was called upon to decide what to do about a lay person who assisted
those of limited means in obtaining divorces. The court found that
Furman's unauthorized practice of law was the symptom of a larger
problem: the unavailability of counsel to those who cannot afford
legal fees. 13 The court directed The Florida Bar to immediately begin
a study to determine ways and means to improve the delivery of legal
services to the indigent. 14 It recognized its obligation to promote
affordable legal services in unequivocal terms:
Without question, it is our responsibility to promote the full availa-
bility of legal services. We deem it more appropriate, however, to
address this issue in a separate proceeding. By doing so under our
supervisory power, we insure a thorough consideration of the over-
all problem without delaying the present adjudication.' 5
Rosemary Furman was enjoined from the practice of law. 6
In accordance with the court's mandate, and in cooperation with
the Center for Governmental Responsibility at the University of Flor-
ida, The Florida Bar conducted a study (the Furman Study) of the
10. Levinson & Strong, Methods of Increasing the Supply of Legal Services to the Indigent
in Florida (Feb. 7, 1972) (approved by Legal Aid and Indigent Defendant Committee of The
Florida Bar on February 7, 1972).
11. Levinson & Strong, supra note 9, at 12-13.
12. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979).
13. Devising means for providing effective legal services to the indigent and poor is
a continuing problem .... In spite of laudable efforts by the bar, however, this
record suggests that even more attention needs to be given to this subject.
Id. at 382.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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legal needs of Florida indigents. 17 It reported that while no definitive
study on the legal needs of the poor existed, independent researchers
estimate that each year poor people have six million legal problems
that require the services of an attorney."8 In addition, the American
Bar Association has estimated that 23% of the poor need the services
of an attorney each year. 19 The Furman Study summarized the prob-
lem by stating that "because of his or her financial condition, a poor
person has more severe legal problems and less access to the legal
system." 2
0
The Furman Study concluded that although our system of justice
is not overtly partial or closed, the complexity of the legal system
results in partiality.21 It concluded that "there are substantial defi-
ciencies in the delivery of legal services to both middle income and
poor persons in Florida" 22 and that the problem is more serious for
the poor. 23
17. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7.
18. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, app. I, at 214.
19. Id. app. M, at 249.
20. Indeed, the poor's need for legal services has always far exceeded the available supply
of free or low-cost services. Reginald Heber Smith described the situation as it existed early in
this century:
The essentially conservative bench and bar will vehemently deny any suggestion
that there is no law for poor, but, as the legal aid societies know, such is the belief
today of a multitude of humble, entirely honest people, and in light of their
experience it appears as the simple truth.
R. SMITH, supra note 2, at 11 (footnotes omitted). Although greater resources are being allo-
cated to provide legal services to the poor today, the Legal Services Corporation has estimated
that federal support in the amount of $300 million per year will ensure that only 15% of the
need is met. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, at 5. Federal spending is currently below that
level.
21. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, at 3. Reginald Heber Smith described this well when
he stated:
We do not, as in Nero's time, write our laws in small letters at the top of high
columns, but the multitudinous laws in our voluminous case books and statute
books are as hard to learn. Similarly, the procedural law, in accordance with
which litigation must be conducted, is a maze to the uninitiated; it is a science in
itself. The law permits every man to try his own case, but "the lay vision of every
man his own lawyer has been shown by all experience to be an illusion."
R. SMITH, supra note 2, at 31-32 (quoting Pound, Administration of Justice in the Modern City,
26 HARV. L. REV. 302, 319 (1913)).
22. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, at 6.
23. In the words of the study:
[W]hile there is a gap between needs and services for all levels of income, the
need is most critical for the poor. Whereas many legal issues are left unresolved
for middle income groups, the unmet needs for the poor usually have more severe
consequences in terms of effects on their property, health, and lives.
Id. at 5. The situation in Florida is the norm, not the exception.
Poor people are prone to legal trouble. They are often defendants, rarely plain-
tiffs. They are bewildered and bemused by legalities they face daily as parents,
1987]
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The study also presented a "Priority Agenda for Reform," which
listed thirteen items requiring action by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida, The Florida Bar, the Legislature, the Executive Branch, and the
Legal Services Corporation. The recommendations were divided into
three areas, corresponding to areas that the study found to be essen-
tial to an effective legal system: (1) information about the system;
(2) access to representation; and (3) access to a means of dispute reso-
lution.24 In the area of representation, the primary recommendation
was mandatory pro bono.25 The Florida Bar filed the Furman Study
with the court, as ordered. The court, however, did not convene
supervisory proceedings as promised.
B. The Emergency Delivery26 Case
The Furman Study was conducted when federal legal services
funding27 was at historically high levels. Beginning in 1982, substan-
tial budget cuts in that program crippled legal services providers and
created what some viewed as a legal aid crisis.28 Loss of funding29 led
consumers, tenants, recipients of public assistance, accused offenders. If poverty
itself is the root of most of their legal troubles, their escape may lie, at least in
part, in establishing legal rights that the landlord, the social agency, the neigh-
borhood merchant, and the police will honor.
P. WALD, LAW AND POVERTY: REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAW AND
POVERTY 6 (1965).
24. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, at 1-2.
25. The study recommended "[i]mplementation, on a statewide basis, of a plan similar to
the Orange County Bar Association Plan for pro bono representation." Id. at 1. The Orange
County Bar requires all of its members to either: (1) handle two cases referred by the Legal
Aid Society, without fee; or (2) pay $250 per year toward the society's funding. Marin-Rosa &
Stepter, Orange County-Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary Bar Association, FLA. B.J., Dec.
1985, at 21.
26. In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Servs. to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983). Here
the court was asked to act on the Furman Study's recommendation by adopting a mandatory
pro bono plan.
27. The federal government funds staff attorney programs that provide representation to
indigents without fee in civil matters throughout the state, primarily through the Legal
Services Corporation. Federal funds are "the primary source of funds for poverty law," and
are thus the mainstay of civil legal services programs. FURMAN STUDY, supra note 7, at 26.
28. See The Return of Unequal Justice?, TIME, Dec. 27, 1982, at 48.
29. Federal funding of legal services programs in Florida fell from $10,194,910 in 1981, to
$7,885,727 in 1982. Legal Services Corporation, Characteristics of Field Programs Supported
by the Legal Services Corporation Start of 1982-A Fact Book 5 (Feb. 1982) [hereinafter Fact
Book] (available through Florida Legal Services, Inc.). Nationally, federal funding also fell
significantly and has not yet managed to recover to former levels. In fiscal year 1981, the
Legal Services Corporation Field Program annualized funding level for basic field programs
totaled $264,024,704 nationally. In fiscal year 1982, that funding dropped to $204,163,670.
Although by fiscal year 1986 funding had reached $246,172,378, it still fell short of the 1981
level of funding.
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to loss of staff,3 0 and the ability of legal services programs to serve the
legal needs of Florida's poor was significantly curtailed.
The Florida Bar responded to these developments by appointing
a Special Committee on Pro Bono Service to study the situation and
to make recommendations to the Board of Governors. The commit-
tee found that voluntary pro bono programs had "very limited partici-
pation by private attorneys," and determined, as had the Furman
Study, that a statewide mandatory pro bono plan like that in opera-
tion in Orange County was needed. 3  The Board of Governors unani-
mously rejected the Committee's proposal. 32  Not satisfied with the
Bar's response, members of the committee and other concerned bar
members brought the matter directly to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida.3 3  They asked the court to amend the Integration Rule34 to
require attorneys, as a condition of licensure, to make legal services
available to the poor either by donating their time, donating their
money, or participating in the IOTA Program.35  The petitioners
30. For example, Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc., the legal services program in
Miami, lost 40% of its staff as a result of the cutbacks. Of the 212 fulltime attorneys who
worked with legal services programs in Florida in 1981, only 146 remained in 1982. Of the 56
legal services offices operating in 1981, only 39 were operating in 1982. Fact Book, supra note
29, at 9.
31. Fla. Pro Bono Report, supra note 7, at 2. The Committee, chaired by Neil Chonin,
sought first to coordinate and encourage pro bono programs. Members assembled information,
made personal contact with bar leaders and members, and assisted in the preparation of
criteria for pro bono awards. Id. at 2-3. The Committee's request that the members of the
Board of Governors each take a pro bono case and lead the effort by example got a positive
response from only one member. Id. at 3. The lack of success with voluntary efforts prompted
the mandatory proposal. Id. at 4. The Committee suggested that the Board petition the
Supreme Court to adopt a mandatory plan. Id. at 7.
32. Board Votes Against Mandatory Pro Bono, Fla. Bar News, Mar. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
33. Donating Legal Services to Poor Splits Lawyers, Miami Herald, Nov. 14, 1982, at Dl,
col. 5; Group Calls for Mandatory Legal Aid, Florida Times Union, Nov. 23, 1982, at B3, col.
2; Mandatory Legal Aid Petition Filed, Florida Bar News, Dec. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Put More
Pro in Pro Bono, Miami Herald, Feb. 6, 1983, at E2, col. 3; Mandatory Pro Bono Is Not for the
Public Good, Tallahassee Democrat, Jan. 9, 1983, at 2B; Court Hears Pro Bono Arguments,
Florida Bar News, Mar. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
34. Integration Rule of The Florida Bar art. XIII (1986).
35. The proposed amendment sought to require, as a requirement of continued
membership in The Florida Bar, that each member, at his or her option:
1. donate, without the expectation of receiving a fee, at least twenty-five
(25) hours of his or her professional service to assist in the delivery of legal
services to the poor; or
2. donate five hundred ($500) dollars to The Florida Bar Foundation to
assist in the delivery of legal services to the poor; or
3. fully participate in the Interest on Trust Account Program.
Emergency Petition to Amend Integration Rule By Addition of an Article Entitled "Delivery
Of Legal Services To The Poor" at 1, In re The Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the
Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983) (No. 62,889) [hereinafter Petition] (footnote omitted). The last
two options were designed to make funding available for staff programs. The petition was filed
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advised the court that budget cuts had created a crisis in representa-
tion of the poor, and that a mandatory pro bono plan was the Furman
Study's primary suggestion for increasing representation.36 They also
argued that the Code of Professional Responsibility confirmed the
lawyer's special responsibility in this area and provided a basis for
strong court action.37 The Florida Bar opposed the petition. 8
The court recognized that the problem it had identified in
Furman I still existed. 9 It rejected the petition, not because it denied
its responsibility to make counsel available, but because it believed
mandatory remedies were inappropriate and might be unconstitu-
tional." The court characterized the ethical requirements of the Code
as "idealistic talk," and found the ethical canons in this area to only
be directory: to enlighten the conscience rather than to compel the
involuntary act.4' The court neither adopted a substitute measure nor
conducted further proceedings-a response inconsistent with the
pursuant to articles 2 and 5 of the Florida Constitution and article XIII of the Integration
Rule of The Florida Bar, and was signed by more than 50 bar members.
36. Petition supra note 35, at 3, 4, 7, 13.
37. Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable fees
has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted court
appointments on behalf of such individuals. The basic responsibility for
providing legal services for those- unable to pay ultimately rests upon the
individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a
lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980). Ethical consideration 8-3
provides, in part, that "[tihose persons unable to pay for legal services should be provided
needed services." Id. at EC 8-3. The petitioners sought "mandatory enforcement of these
stated ethical considerations." In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Servs. to the Poor, 432 So.
2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983).
38. Response of The Florida Bar in Opposition to the Petition. The Bar argued that it was
working to address the legal needs of the poor, that the proposed rule would create more
problems than it would solve, and that the plan was constitutionally infirm. More recently, the
Bar sought and obtained court approval of a mandatory continuing legal education
requirement. See Changes to Come.- Supreme Court Approves CLE Requirement, Florida Bar
News, Apr. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
39. The court conceded that "[t]here are people in need of legal services who are unable to
pay for those services. All persons, however, should have the opportunity of obtaining
effective legal services and should have meaningful access to the courts." 432 So. 2d at 41.
The court did not appear sensitive to the fact that budget cuts had made the situation worse
than when it ordered the Furman Study.
40. The court stated: "We have been loathe to coerce involuntary servitude in all walks of
life; we do not forceably take property without just compensation; we do not mandate acts of
charity. We believe that a person's voluntary service to others has to come from within the
soul of that person." Id. This decision drew response from outside the legal community. See
Challengefor State's Lawyers, Fla. Times-Union, May 24, 1983, at _; Justice Is a Warm Glow,
Gainesville Sun, May 23, 1983, at 4A; Poor Justice, Miami Herald, May 23, 1983, at A12, col.
I.
41. 432 So. 2d at 41.
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court's recognition, in Furman I, that it is obligated to promote the
full availability of legal services.
C. Furman II
The Florida Bar renewed its attack on Rosemary Furman in
1982 (Furman II),42 even though it had done little to implement the
recommendations of the Furman Study, and had actively opposed the
petition in the Emergency Delivery case. This time the Bar alleged
that Furman had violated the earlier injunction against practicing law
and should therefore be punished by incarceration.43 An amicus
brief filed in that case suggested that the court "should not pass judg-
ment in this case without pausing to consider the progress which has
been made towards providing legal services to indigents since this
matter last came before this Court."" The brief quoted the specific
recommendations made in the "Priority Agenda for Reform" set out
in the Furman Study, and detailed the lack of progress that had been
made in studying and implementing them.45 The brief concluded:
This Court must follow through on its commitment to
"examine the problem and consider solutions," 376 So. 2d at 382,
before it decides the issue of punishment in this case. Some realis-
tic solution to the problem must be adopted and given time to work
before non-lawyers are prosecuted for stepping in to provide serv-
ices the legal profession has refused to make available. In the
Furman decision, this Court has recognized that it has the author-
ity under its supervisory power to address the problem. This Court
also has the duty to do so, and to do so not only in reaction to
proposals from members of the bar.46
The court paid no heed. It noted only that the amicus had
"favored us with dissertations on what... measures this court should
initiate in order to provide free legal services in civil proceedings" and
that "[w]e are not here, in this instance, to consider the broad [ques-
tion] of ... what, if any, free legal services should be provided in civil
actions."47 The court did not indicate when it might convene the
supervisory proceedings which it had promised in 1979.48
Although lawyers have not traditionally been held in the highest
42. Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984).
43. See id.
44. Brief for Amicus Curiae Southern Legal Counsel, Inc. at 3, Florida Bar v. Furman,
451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984) (Nos. 63,380, 62,676).
45. Id. at 4-10.
46. Id. at 23.
47. Florida Bar v. Furman, 451 So. 2d 808, 812-13 (Fla. 1984).
48. The court found Furman in contempt and imposed a sentence of 120 days, with 90
days suspended. The Florida Cabinet later awarded Furman a pardon.
1987]
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esteem by the public,49 many would probably agree that the public's
opinion of our profession has fallen sharply in the last few years. We
need not search far for the cause of this public discontent. The
Furman cases have been a primary source of adverse publicity.50 And
while bar members may understand that our poor public image is the
result of our meager efforts to guarantee access to the justice system,51
many members seem to believe that the proper response is a good
public relations campaign.
The referee in Furman II found that Rosemary Furman was "fly-
ing under the flag of 'access to the court,' "52 and acknowledged that,
to "the poor, the illiterate-the man on the street-she may seem a
fighter-a champion. "' 3 If we are determined to change the public's
perception of the bar, perhaps we should begin by taking up the flag
of access to the courts, and through our actions, prove that we are the
champion of the man on the street.
D. The Adoption of Rules of Professional Conduct
The court had the opportunity to take up the flag of access to the
courts in the proceedings that it convened in 1984 to replace the Code
of Professional Responsibility with the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.54  In the Emergency Delivery case, the court held that the ethi-
cal requirements of the Code in this area were not enforceable.55 The
proceedings to replace the Code gave the court the opportunity to
adopt enforceable requirements.
The Florida Bar recommended that the court adopt Model Rule
6.1. That rule, proposed in Florida as Rule 4-6.1, provides: "A law-
49. One commentator has noted: "From Shakespeare to Sandburg and beyond, poets have
eloquently expressed popular dissatisfaction with lawyers and with their trade." Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 789.
50. See Furman Case Victory Is Hollow for State Bar, Ruling Highlights a Festering Issue:
Legal Aid to Poor, Miami Herald, Feb. 13, 1984, at Al, col. 2 (case is looking "like a public
relations disaster for the state's legal establishment"); Case Challenges the Legal System, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 12, 1984, at 17, col. 1. Sixty Minutes also did a segment with Rosemary Furman.
Sixty Minutes: People's Court (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 29, 1984).
51. It may be that in the eyes of the public progress on all the other ethical
problems will not be considered as significant as it might be until this difference
between the rich and the not-so-rich in access to lawyers' services is eliminated.
Pincus, One Man's Perspective on Ethics and the Legal Profession, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279,
281 (1975).
52. Recommended Findings of Fact, Judgment and Sentence at 17, Florida Bar v.
Furman, 451 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1984) (Nos. 63,380, 62,676).
53. Id. at 27.
54. This revision followed the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by the
American Bar Association.
55. In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Servs. to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1983).
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yer should render public interest legal service."56 Although the lan-
guage of this ethical requirement may seem clear enough, there is
reason to question what the rule actually requires. First, there is a
question concerning its enforceability. The comment to the rule pro-
vides: "This Rule expresses that policy but is not intended to be
enforced through disciplinary process."' 57 This is the only rule of pro-
fessional conduct that is not enforceable by disciplinary process. If
the rule is not to be enforced through disciplinary process, the tradi-
tional method of enforcing ethical requirements, is it to be enforced
some other way? For example, should courts enforce the rule by
making uncompensated appointments? The rule does not give any
guidance on this point. Even if it were enforceable by disciplinary
process, the rule would still be deficient because it does not specify
how much public service is required. One observer has noted: "Not
imposing a quantity minimum is 'like saying you've got to love your
mother' ..... It makes the obligation meaningless."8
The American Bar Association (ABA) "legislative history" of
the rule gives further reason to question the nature of the obligation it
imposes.5 9 The history shows that the rule was watered down in
response to criticism from bar members who feared that the rule
might impose a definite and enforceable public service requirement.
The initial draft of the proposed rules contained a rule titled: "Service
to pro bono publico." It proposed a requirement of forty hours per
year of pro bono service, or the financial equivalent thereof.6" Other
early drafts called for mandatory public service and contained report-
56. THE FLORIDA BAR, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 147 (n.d.) [hereinafter COMMITrEE REPORT]. This
language is the same as Model Rule 6.1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 6.1 (1980). The Florida rule goes on to explain that this responsibility may be discharged
by:
(a) providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited
means, or to public service or charitable groups or organizations; or (b) service
without compensation in public interest activities that improve the law, the legal
system or the legal profession; or (c) financial support for organizations that
provide legal services to persons of limited means.
COMMITrEE REPORT, supra, at 147. The language of this portion of the Florida rule is some-
what different than the ABA model rule. The Committe Report states that: "The Rule has
been restructured to make it clear that the 'pro bono publico' obligation can also be discharged
by uncompensated service in public interest activities and by financial support for legal service
organizations." Id. at 149.
57. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 56, at 149.
58. Cowger, Proposal Readied on Mandatory Pro Bono, 65 A.B.A. J. 1779, 1780 (1979).
59. For a summary of this history, see Shapiro, supra note 3, at 735-38.
60. Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 27, 1979, at 45-46. The comment to the rule provided:
"What is required is in essence a professional tithing in a definite amount."
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ing requirements. 6 These drafts were consistent with the call for a
strong public service requirement that predated the rulemaking in this
area.62 The ABA's final draft dropped the reporting requirement63
and changed the requirement that a lawyer "shall" perform such ser-
vice, to the requirement that the lawyer "should" do so. The Chair-
man's Introduction to the Proposed Final Draft states: "The
Discussion Draft . . . called for mandatory pro bono legal service.
This Final Draft does not."6
Notwithstanding the legislative history and the comment on
enforceability, there is still an argument that the adoption of the rule
creates a mandatory public service obligation.65 This argument finds
three sources of support. First, the structure of the rules was intended
to be a departure from the aspirational/mandatory dichotomy of the
Ethical Considerations/Disciplinary Rules format of the Code. It is
difficult to see how a rule can be other than mandatory under the
approach the drafters chose to adopt. Second, the Florida legislative
history refers to the rule as creating a " 'pro bono publico' obliga-
tion."66 Third, although the comment and the legislative history are
aids to construction, "the text of each rule is authoritative,"67 and the
text unambiguously states that lawyers should perform uncompen-
sated service.
Concerned bar members asked the court to clarify the obligation
imposed by the rule. When the court considered the new rules, mem-
bers appeared and argued that the court should adopt a clear and
enforceable ethical requirement instead of the bar proposal, or should
at least revise the proposal to replace "should" with "shall" and
61. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (Discussion Draft
1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Tentative Draft No. 3 1979).
62. In August 1975, the American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted the
Montreal Resolution, which recognized "[t]hat it is a basic professional responsibility of each
lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest legal services ... [which are]
legal service[s] provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee." N.Y. PRO BONO
REPORT, supra note 7, app. A-I, at 26.
63. The reporting requirement was dropped "[a]mid warnings that opposition to a
provision requiring annual reporting of mandatory pro bono service could lead to rejection of
[the Commission's] entire draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Slonim,
Commission Votes Down Pro Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A. J. 951, 951 (1980). Commission
Chairman Robert Kutak reported that "the mandatory pro bono rule had drawn more fire
than other controversial proposals" contained in the draft. Id.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT introduction at ii (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
65. For a somewhat optimistic view of Model Rule 6.1 and the obligation it imposes, see
Spencer, supra note 3, at 513-15 (The Rule is a "partial victory" although it "represents a
comparatively minor change from the status quo.").
66. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 56, at 149.
67. Id. at 5.
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delete the comment on enforceability.6" It was suggested that if the
rule was not meant to be enforceable, it should be withdrawn from the
rules altogether to avoid giving the public the wrong impression of
what lawyers believe their responsibility to be.6 9
While the rulemaking proceeding was pending, the Bar con-
ducted yet another study of the legal needs of the poor in Florida.7°
The Special Commission on Access to the Legal System issued a
report to the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar on May 16,
1985.71
For those who were unconvinced by the Levinson Study of
1971, or the Furman Study of 1980, we report the overwhelming
testimony of lawyers and the lay citizens expressed at our public
hearings concerning the unmet need for legal services within the
State. If anything, the overwhelming statistics of need have been
exacerbated by recent cutbacks in federal programs.
We see only two solutions which can provide any real relief to
this need: (1) Money to hire lawyers to represent the poor;
(2) Time devoted by private lawyers to representation of those who
cannot pay. Other solutions, such as simplification of procedures
so people can represent themselves can provide some relief but can-
not come close to addressing the need. Unless we can obtain addi-
tional funding and/or additional donated time, we as a profession
are basically unable to meet this problem. Unless we are willing to
take steps to obtain funding or donated time, we should admit to
ourselves and the public that we have no real solution.72
The Special Commission's primary recommendation was the
amendment of proposed Rule 4-6.1, then pending before the court, to
substitute "shall" for "should" and to revise the comment that indi-
cated the rule would not be enforceable by disciplinary process. 73 The
68. Brief in Support of the Adoption of a Clear and Enforceable Public Service
Requirement passim; Brief in Opposition to Proposed Rule 4-6.1 at 8, Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986) (No. 65,877). These briefs specifically addressed the
court's earlier concerns with involuntary servitude, the taking of property without just
compensation, and mandating charity, and reviewed the legislative history of the rule.
69. Oral argument of Neil Chonin Before the Supreme Court of Florida, Rules Regulating
The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986) (No. 65,877).
70. See New Panel Formed for Legal Aid, Miami Herald, Dec. 2, 1984, at B2.
71. SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7. The Commission, composed of 16 members, was
appointed by the Governor, the Chief Justice, and the President of The Florida Bar, to explore
various alternatives to increase access to the legal system. The Commission included lawyers
and nonlawyers from a geographical cross section of the state. Over a 10-month period, the
Commission met throughout the state and held public hearings in Tallahassee, Tampa, and
Miami. Id. at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3-6. The Commission's second most important recommendation was that the
Board of Governors press for the adoption of a mandatory IOTA Program. Id. at 7.
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Commission was critical of the Bar's proposal. It noted:
This is not a statement of principle to which the profession
should repair. To the contrary, it says to the lawyer who does not
want to meet the profession's responsibilities, "That's o.k., we
don't think this Rule is as important as the others." It is the wrong
signal to the student, the young lawyer, the lawyer who fails to
shoulder ethical duty, and the public who asks what this profession
stands for.74
The court ignored the recommendation of the Special Commis-
sion and proceeded to adopt Rule 4-6.1 as proposed by the Bar. The
opinion accompanying the new Rules of Professional Conduct did not
discuss this issue. Remarkably, it did not even mention that questions
had been raised concerning the lawyer's duty to serve the public inter-
est, although that was the most contested issue in the proceeding. 75
The status of the lawyer's duty in this area therefore remains unclear.
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION
The studies we continue to commission-and ignore-tell us that
strong action is needed. The latest study found that the only solutions
that can provide real relief are the donation of time or money to pro-
vide counsel to those who cannot afford it. Seven years have passed
since Furman I, and the situation has gotten worse rather than better.
The court has not yet convened the proceedings it promised to insti-
tute pursuant to its supervisory power. The court's failure to
"examine the problem and consider solutions, ' 76 as it said it would, is
difficult to understand. It is clear that the leaders of the organized bar
do not have the independence from member sentiment necessary to
propose a meaningful response.77 Only the Supreme Court of Florida
74. Id. at 5.
75. See In re Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1986).
76. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1979).
77. For example, the Board of Governors and other elected bar leaders are well aware of
the opposition of most bar members to mandatory pro bono. The Florida Bar Membership
Attitude Survey results reflect this opposition:
a. Would you support a mandatory pro bono legal services program
administered by any of the following:
THE FLORIDA BAR (9.7%)
VOLUNTARY BAR ASSOCIATION IN WHICH YOU ARE A MEMBER
(7.9%)
STATE CIRCUIT COURTS (2.1%)
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (0.3%)
OTHER (0.3%)
NO-WOULD NOT SUPPORT A MANDATORY PROGRAM (75.8%)
NO OPINION (3.6%)
DNA (0.2%)
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can address the problem of the unavailability of affordable legal
services.
There is reason to believe that the court will yet provide strong
leadership in this area. The court's limited response to this problem78
may be attributable to the fact that, in the past, it has been content to
react to proposals brought before it for consideration, and has not
taken the initiative to conduct its own study of the problem. If the
court puts itself in the position of those who conducted the Levinson
Study, 9 the Furman Study, and the Special Commission's study,80 it
is possible that it will come to the same conclusions reached in those
studies. No relief is in sight while the court continues to leave the
poor to the mercy of what may or may not spring from the "soul" of
the individual practitioner.
The court has no reason not to act on its pledge to promote the
full availability of legal services. Strong action is both constitutional
and appropriate. Voluntary efforts do not justify inaction. The inde-
b. If you responded in the affirmative to the preceding question, how would you
be willing to support a mandatory pro bono legal services program?
WITH HOURS ONLY (9.5%) OTHER (0.4%)
WITH MONEY ONLY (0.4%) NO OPINION (1.4%)
WITH MONEY OR HOURS (9.2%) DNA (79.1%)
THE FLORIDA BAR, MEMBERSHIP ATrITUDE SURVEY SUMMER 1984: A COMPILATION OF
RESULTS questions 17a-b (1984) [hereinafter SURVEY]. Elected bar leaders cannot be expected
to ignore such statistics, and will not take action that they perceive their constituents oppose.
See Dade Bar Balks at Forced Pro Bono, Fla. Bar News, April 1, 1987, at 17, col. 3 (Dade Bar
votes to pass by-law expecting but not requiring pro bono contributions).
78. The court has taken some action to increase the delivery of legal services to the poor.
The most noteworthy effort was the creation of the IOTA Program. The court also approved
an amendment to the Integration Rule to permit retired attorneys from other jurisdictions to
assist in the delivery of legal services to the poor, after initially rejecting that petition.
Amendment to the Integration Rule, Article XXII (Emeritus Attorneys Pro Bono
Participation Program), 490 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1986); In re Amendment to the Integration Rule,
Article XXII (Emeritus Attorneys Pro Bono Participation Program), 478 So. 2d 338 (Fla.
1985); In re Amendment to Integration Rule (Addition of Article XXII, Emeritus Attorneys
Pro Bono Participation Program), 434 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1983) (denying petition without
prejudice); Rules Regulating The Florida Bar ch. 12, reprinted in 494 So. 2d 979, 1118 (Fla.
1986). In response to Furman, the court simplified the dissolution of marriage procedure for
certain types of cases. The Florida Bar re Amendment to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
(Dissolution of Marriage), 450 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1984); The Florida Bar re Amendment to
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (Dissolution of Marriage), 450 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1984) (noting
that the court had previously simplified procedures in small claims and probate). The dissent
noted that the court's mandate to the Bar in Furman I was to recommend greater access to
legal services, not to the judicial process. The dissent found that simplification of procedures
"does nothing to increase access to legal services," 450 So. 2d at 815, and that "those persons
identified as most in need of relief are those least able to intelligently utilize this rule of
simplified procedure." 450 So. 2d at 816.
79. Levinson & Strong, supra note 9.
80. SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7.
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pendence of the bar is not threatened by strong action, it is promoted
by it.
A. Strong Action Is Constitutional and Appropriate
In the Emergency Delivery case, the court stopped short of hold-
ing that a mandatory plan would violate constitutional proscriptions.
In rejecting the proposal, however, the court made three points: It
was loathe (1) to coerce involuntary servitude; (2) to forceably take
property without just compensation; and (3) to mandate acts of char-
ity. These concerns should not paralyze the court.
The lawyer's duty to serve when required to do so by the courts
is not involuntary servitude."' Few who have advanced the argument
have done so based upon any historical analysis of the thirteenth
amendment, or the many decisions interpreting it.82 An examination
of that case law makes it clear that the thirteenth amendment does
not prohibit the court from requiring an attorney to serve at the
courts' direction without compensation.8 3 The overwhelming major-
ity of courts have held that requiring representation without compen-
sation does not constitute a taking of property without due process of
law in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.84 Courts
have held there is no unconstitutional taking because of the estab-
lished rule that the enforcement of an obligation already owed to the
public cannot constitute a taking for public use prohibited by the fifth
81. Both the involuntary servitude and due process arguments have, in this context, been
characterized as "professionally unattractive and rationally unpersuasive." Yarbrough v.
Superior Ct. of Napa County, 150 Cal. App. 3d 388, 197 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (1983).
82. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 290 (1981); see Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases:
The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 378-82
(1981).
83. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (upholding Florida statute that forced able bodied
men within specified ages to labor on roads and bridges without pay for six 10-hour days each
year); Boblin v. Board of Educ., 403 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1975) (mandatory student
cafeteria duty in public schools); cf Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title
VII Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979), vacated sub. nom. White v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (reversing district court's holding
that provision of Title VII permitting trial court to appoint attorney for indigent plaintiff was
contrary to the thirteenth amendment and hence void, without reaching the merits of the
question); cf also Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, CASE &
COMMENT, July-Aug. 1969, at 4 (inadequate compensation for court-appointed counsel
violates the rights of the indigent defendant and his attorney); Williams, The Assigned Counsel
System: An Exercise In Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32 (1971) (same).
84. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 288 n. 140; Note, supra note 82, at 383-90; see also Weiner
v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 347-48, 148 S.E.2d 143, 146, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958
(1966). But cf Bedford v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968) (invalidating
statute authorizing court appointed counsel for involuntary hospitalization proceedings as a
prohibited taking).
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amendment.8 5
The requirement that each lawyer serve the public interest is not
fairly categorized as mandating acts of charity. Charity is giving that
which one has no duty to give. Lawyers have a state sanctioned
monopoly on the public justice system. They are ethically bound to
help the poor gain access to that system because to do otherwise
would be to deny equal justice to all.
There is serious injustice in the present distribution of legal
resources in our society. The inability to obtain legal assistance
means that people suffer abuses due to lack of knowledge of legal
rights and the inability to enforce these rights under existing
laws-and indeed due to the slow evolution of the laws themselves
in areas of vital concern. As an elite profession holding a monop-
oly on access to the keys of legal power, and as a profession dedi-
cated to justice, the legal profession has a special ethical concern
for alleviating this inequity. Mandatory public service, directed
toward providing legal resources to people who otherwise could
not obtain them, is a just and reasonable step toward affirming and
fulfilling that concern.
Public service so conceived is not charity; rather, it is a regu-
lar part of an attorney's professional life, as much an obligation as
is competence. While public service should not be expected to
solve the problem of unjust distribution of legal resources, a con-
siderable impact is possible.8 6
The requirement that lawyers spend some time or money to
assist the poor in gaining access to our legal system is not unreasona-
bly burdensome. Courts have sustained much more burdensome
requirements. For example, one Florida court found that it had the
authority to appoint counsel to the position of "Acting State Attor-
ney," but that because that appointment was not authorized by stat-
ute, there was a duty to serve but no right to compensation.8 7 Courts
85. Rosenfeld, supra note 82, at 288. In United States v. Dillon, the court found that
forcing an attorney to provide legal services without compensation does not constitute a taking
because he is performing "an obligation imposed upon him by the ancient traditions of his
profession and as an officer assisting the courts in the administration of justice." 346 F.2d 633,
636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1965). The court relied on the Dillon holding in
Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973) (material witness).
86. Spencer, supra note 3, at 519.
87. Dade County v. McCrary, 260 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).
When a court in exercise of its inherent power requests or appoints a practicing
attorney to undertake a representation, where no provision is made by law for
public compensation of the attorney, whether the appointment is to represent an
indigent, or to represent a court in opposing prohibition or in prosecuting a
contempt, it is the duty of the lawyer to respond, and to so serve without
compensation. This is so because attorneys are a privileged class which alone is
permitted to practice in the courts, and their privileges as such carry
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around the country have generally upheld uncompensated appoint-
ments."8 A requirement that all lawyers devote time or money to
public service is less burdensome than appointment. When acting to
satisfy an ethical requirement, the attorney can choose the project on
which he or she will work or to which he or she will contribute, and
can participate at a convenient time and place. If appointment is con-
stitutional, so is an ethical requirement.
Strong action is not only constitutional, it is appropriate. The
ethical requirements in this area have created an obligation of uncer-
tain dimensions. A clear and enforceable obligation is needed. The
Orange County experience suggests that lawyers are more opposed to
the imposition of an enforceable requirement than they are to working
under one. Mandatory pro bono is a tradition of the Orange County
Bar Association. Each member takes two legal aid cases or pays $250
to the Legal Aid Society each year. There is no problem with lawyer
noncompliance, and no criticism. New lawyers who enter that bar are
instilled with the tradition, and come to accept it as their own. There
is every reason to believe that other members of The Florida Bar
would come to accept a mandatory plan in much the same way.
B. The Voluntary Activities of Florida Lawyers
Do Not Justify Inaction
The court's failure to take strong action cannot be justified on the
grounds that lawyers are voluntarily shouldering their ethical burden.
The Florida Bar has gone to great lengths in recent years to demon-
strate the significance of voluntary efforts. 9 The simple answer to the
corresponding duties and obligations, including the undertaking of those
representations when called upon by a court, notwithstanding the services thus
performed otherwise could justify substantial compensation.
Id. at 545-46 (emphasis in original omitted).
88. Note, supra note 82, at 371 (collecting cases).
89. For example, the Bar produced a special issue of The Florida Bar Journal in December
1985, titled Maintaining Justice Through Pro Bono Legal Services: How Much Progress Has
Florida Made?, which attempted to justify the Bar's voluntary approach. The Bar published
articles that supported its position, and refused to publish those that did not. An article by this
author on the "Lawyer's Duty to Serve the Public Interest" was rejected after the author
refused to delete references to mandatory pro bono and mandatory IOTA. The article,
although critical of the Bar's position, had been written at the invitation of the Bar committee
sponsoring the issue on a topic of its choosing. An article by Peter Siegel and Randall C. Berg,
Jr. titled "Mandatory IOTA-Why Not?" was also rejected. The Bar, in rejecting an article
by Neil Chonin, yet another contributor who was skeptical of the Bar's progress on the pro
bono front, explained its position as follows:
My Editorial Board recommends that the debate on mandatory pro bono and
mandatory IOTA participation not be included in this issue. They feel that the
topics have been thoroughly aired in many forums-in The Florida Bar News, in
Supreme Court petitions, before the Board of Governors, and elsewhere.
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Bar's public relations campaign is that, because the demand for free
or low cost legal services will always far exceed the supply, voluntary
efforts are not adequate to the task. The Bar's position is supported
by its judgment that the increase in services which logic dictates
would result from a mandatory program is not worth that effort. It is
doubtful that the poor share this perspective.
The Bar has attempted to establish the amount of pro bono ser-
vice provided by Florida lawyers through annual membership
surveys. Even if the validity of the survey approach is conceded, 90 the
statistics that the Bar has compiled to justify its voluntary approach
are not impressive. The 1984 survey reports:
How many hours in calendar year 1983 did you voluntarily
spend providing pro bono legal services to individuals you knew
could not afford to pay for the services?
NONE (30.3%) 26 - 50 (13.6%)
1 - 10 (21.8%) MORE THAN 50 (13.4%)
11 - 25 (20.1%) DNA (0.9%)91
The 1986 survey reports:
How many hours of pro bono legal work during 1986 did you
provide to individuals you knew could not afford to pay for your
services?
Letter from Linda H. Yates to Neil Chonin (Oct. 17, 1985). However, the Bar's bias went
beyond screening out articles that mentioned the word "mandatory." One article that was
accepted was edited, without the author's permission, to delete material inconsistent with the
Bar's thesis that all is well. For example, the editors deleted the following text from Berg,
Making a "Firm" Commitment, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1985, at 45:
[M]any associates and young partners report that their firms give only "lip ser-
vice" to pro bono. In fact, they give little--or no--encouragement to the actual
fulfillment of their professed commitment to help those in need.
Telehpone interview between Stephen Maher and Randall C. Berg, Jr. (Apr. 28, 1987).
90. There is reason to suspect the accuracy of the responses to these surveys for three
reasons. First, it is possible, if not likely, that the respondents-who as a group are
overwhelmingly opposed to mandatory pro bono, see supra note 77, and as a group are
sensitive to the well publicized criticism of lawyers on this score, see, e.g., Lawyers Squirm in
Face of Plan to Help Needy, Miami Herald, Feb. 1, 1982, Business Monday Section, at 5-
would tend to be expansive in the quantification of their contributions to society. Following
this logic, the respondents' admission of no or low pro bono hours might be more credible than
higher hour estimates. Second, the survey does not require the respondents to identify any
particulars of the pro bono service they claim to have rendered. A study requesting such
information would be more reliable. Third, the survey does not distinguish between free work
done for the poor and for other income groups who cannot afford the high cost of legal
services. The President of The Florida Bar conceded, in a press release titled "Four out of
Five Florida Lawyers Provide Some Free Legal Services" announcing the results of the latest
survey, that "in all probability much of the legal work was donated to middle class persons."
The Florida Bar, Press Release (Feb. 26, 1987).
91. SURVEY, supra note 77, question 15a.
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NONE (16.8%) 26- 50 (18%)
LESS THAN 10 (17.7%) 50 - 100 (12.2%)
10 - 25 (25.6%) MORE THAN 100 (9.7%)92
Although these statistics show an increase in pro bono activity, they
also demonstrate that many lawyers are not meeting their ethical obli-
gations. By the respondents' own admission, more than half still con-
tribute only 25 hours or less to pro bono representation of individuals,
and many admit contributing none at all. Thus, even a mandatory
25-hour requirement would significantly increase the availability of
legal services to the poor.
The surveys also demonstrate another reason for considering a
mandatory plan. Current voluntary efforts fall too heavily on the
shoulders of a small and already burdened segment of the Bar.
Those lawyers who are already overburdened in their practices
provided more pro bono services than other attorneys in Florida.
Nearly 80% of those attorneys who spend over 60 hours per week
practicing law provided pro bono hours .... 9'
A mandatory pro bono system would assure that the Bar's ethical
burden is borne by all lawyers.
The surveys show an estimate of the aggregate number of pro
bono hours contributed by Bar members: 699,468 hours in the 1986
survey.94 Although some may find these statistics comforting in the
abstract, there is no question that the poor's need for legal services far
exceeds the hours provided. In addition, these figures also show that
"the few" are carrying the burden of "the many." Of the 699,468
hours contributed in 1986, 581,023, or 83%, were contributed by
39.9% of Bar members. The inequity of the current voluntary system
can be corrected if an enforceable ethical requirement is adopted.
The Commission on Access to the Legal System also suggested
that current pro bono efforts were unsatisfactory:
Our public hearings revealed that many lawyers are perform-
ing substantial pro bono services for those who cannot afford them.
For example, the Orange County, Tallahassee and Palm Beach Bar
Associations require their members to participate in legal aid as a
condition of membership. At our Tampa hearing, a representative
92. Pro Bono Hours Donated by Florida's Private Practitioners in 1986, at 1-2 (1987)
(Based on data collected and prepared by the Planning, Evaluation, and Research Department
of The Florida Bar).
93. McGinnis, Pro Bono in Florida: Contributions from Private Practitioners, 14 STETSON
L. REV. 319, 322-23 (1985) (analyzing the results of the 1984 survey).
94. There is reason to question these figures, because the lawyers polled did not estimate
their hours, they merely responded in ranges of hours. The median in each range was used to
calculate the hours estimate. Thus, the hours estimates may be wrong even if respondents all
answered the survey correctly.
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of Bay Area Legal Services reported that over 350 attorneys,
including members of corporate legal staffs, have signed up as pro
bono counsel.
Nevertheless, the performance varies widely throughout
regions of the state. Many lawyers do nothing at all, leaving fulfill-
ment of the profession's obligations to their brethren.
We believe that the Florida Supreme Court and The Florida
Bar have a responsibility to speak unequivocally and firmly con-
cerning the obligation of every lawyer to assure that persons who
cannot afford representation obtain counsel.95
We cannot assume that the situation will improve over time because
the situation has deteriorated since the Furman Study, and experts
foresee cutbacks in voluntary pro bono activities in the future as a
result of pressures for more billable hours.96
C. The Independence of the Legal Profession Is Promoted, Not
Threatened, by Strong Action
It has been suggested that the "spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised" is what distin-
guishes our profession from a trade or business. 97 It may be that if we
lose that spirit, we lose part of the rationale that has traditionally been
advanced for regulating the Bar differently than any other trade or
business.9" The court's leadership abilities are another important part
of the rationale for maintaining the current structure of Bar regula-
tion.99 The court has shown that it has the ability to be creative in
meeting the challenge of delivering legal services to the poor. It
demonstrated exemplary insight and leadership when it pioneered the
IOTA Program. Since Florida became the first state to adopt IOTA,
95. SPECIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 3-4.
96. Bottom Line Analysis.- Cutbacks in Bar Activities, Pro Bono Seen by Expert, A.B.A. J.
May 1, 1987, at 24.
97. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 10 (1953).
98. For example, during the course of legislative hearings to review regulation of the legal
profession in Florida, the following occurred:
Representative James Harold Thompson asked Bar President L. David Shear
why an integrated bar was better than a voluntary one. Shear responded that an
integrated bar can marshall the manpower and the resources necessary to
implement the public service programs that the Bar provides.
FLORIDA SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 73 (June 5, 1980).
99. When Chief Justice Arthur England opposed the concept of sunset review, and
defended the special position of lawyers among regulated professions in legislative hearings, his
principal points were that the Supreme Court of Florida had demonstrated effective leadership
in the governance of the Bar, and that the court was not isolated from real supervisory control.
"Justice England testified that the court acts on its own initiative to change Bar rules and
policies. It does not always wait until someone comes to it with a problem." Id. at 54-55.
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forty-two states and the District of Columbia have followed Florida's
lead and adopted IOTA programs. 10° Similar leadership and initia-
tive are needed today.
Periodic calls to move regulation of the Bar from the court to the
Department of Professional Regulation, which regulates other profes-
sionals, should not be treated lightly. The relationship between the
Bar's public service responsibility and its independence is closer than
many realize. Independence can only be preserved
by a profession whose members are so well guided by their per-
sonal sense of professional obligation to the public that the public
chooses to leave them largely free from outside regulation. Con-
versely, unless the profession does cultivate and its members do act
upon a high sense of public obligation over'and above pursuit of
the client's self interest, it cannot-and will not deserve to-retain
its freedom from outside control.101
IV. CONCLUSION
Popular dissatisfaction with lawyers and the legal system is more
widespread than many are willing to admit. Our monopoly on access
to the justice system is not secure. It is significant that two of the
legal proceedings discussed in this article (Furman I and II) were
actions to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. There are those
who believe that the repeal of provisions prohibiting unauthorized
practice of law offers a solution to the access problem. For example,
W. Clark Durant III, Chairman of the Legal Services Corporation,
recently advocated the repeal of unauthorized practice restrictions in
an address to the American Bar Association. 0 2 He contended that
those laws could very well be the greatest barrier to low-cost legal
services, and advocated deregulation of lawyers, and permitting
paralegal and lay persons to practice law. 10 3 Whole organizations
have arisen to advocate these positions."° If we hope to effectively
100. IOLTA Programs, IOLTA UPDATE, Winter 1987, at 4-9.
101. Cox, The Conditions of Independence for the Legal Profession, in THE LAWYER'S
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 55 (1984) (published by the American Bar Association). This
theme also is expressed in the preamble to the Model Rules:
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of
self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations
are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the Bar.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
102. Summary of address by W. Clark Durrant III, Amercian Bar Association Mid-Year
Meeting, 55 U.S.L.W. 2453 (Feb. 24, 1987).
103. Id. at 2453-54.
104. For example, HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny), Inc., an organization seeking
"legal reform," has recently begun opening local chapters. Significantly, its pilot effort was in
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respond to such efforts, we cannot continue to ignore the unmet need
for access to legal services.
The court can change the perception that the legal system works
for the rich but not for the poor, but it must change that perception
with actions, not with words. If we continue to be satisfied to make
lawyers available only to those who can afford the high cost of litiga-
tion, people will lose their faith in our system of justice.1"5 When that
happens-and unless we act, it will happen--even the remedies now
rejected as too radical will be of little use.
Florida. HAL T Launches Effort to Build Local Chapters, Americans for Legal Reform (ALR),
Summer 1986, at 6; see also Competition Would Boost Access to the Legal System, St.
Petersburg Times, Nov. 23, 1984, at A19, col. I (HALT director Thomas Mostowy stated:
"One has to wonder just how committed the Florida Bar is to improving access to the legal
system in light of this delay" in implementing the Furman Study.).
105. The significance of such a development is hard to overstate.
The law is real, but it is also a figment of our imaginations. Like all fundamental
social institutions it casts a shadow of popular belief that may ultimately be more
significant, albeit more difficult to comprehend, than the authorities, rules, and
penalties that we ordinarily associate with law. What we believe reflects our
values; it also colors our perceptions. What we believe about the law is related
directly to the legitimacy of our political institutions.
S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 3 (1974).
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